Vitalik: It is important that DAO is not decentralized by the company's autonomous organization
Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about the view that highly decentralized DAO is not feasible. DAO governance should start to be closer to traditional corporate governance in order to maintain competitiveness. The arguments are always similar: highly decentralized governance is inefficient, while the traditional corporate governance structure consisting of the board of directors and CEO has evolved for hundreds of years to optimize the goal of making correct decisions and creating value for shareholders in the changing world. The idealists of DAO naively assume that the decentralized egalitarian ideal can go beyond this, while attempts to do so in the traditional enterprise sector can only achieve negligible success at best.
This article will discuss why this position is often wrong, and provide a different and more detailed view to explain what different types of decentralization are important in. In particular, I will focus on three important situations of decentralization:
Decentralization helps to make better decisions in a concave environmentIn such an environment, diversity and even childish forms of compromise may on average be superior to the consistency and focus brought about by centralization.
AuditableDecentralization: An application that needs to continue to run while resisting attacks from powerful external actors.
Decentralization is credible fairness: DAO performs functions similar to nation states in applications, such as providing basic infrastructure, so predictability, robustness and neutrality are more valuable than efficiency.
Centralization is convex and decentralization is concave
One way to categorize the decisions you need to make is to see if they areConvexOrconcaveof When choosing between A and B, we will not consider the problem of A and B itself, but a higher question: Would you rather compromise between A and B or toss a coin? In terms of expected utility, we can use charts to express this difference:
If a decision is concave, we would rather compromise; if it is convex, we would rather toss a coin. Generally, we can more easily answer the high-level question of whether compromise or coin toss is better than answering the first order questions of A and B themselves.
Examples of convex decisions include:
Pandemic response measures: A 100% travel ban may help keep the virus out of the door. A 0% travel ban will not stop the virus, but at least it will not cause inconvenience to people. But 50% or 90% travel bans have the best of both worlds.
Military strategyIt may be reasonable to attack Line A and Line B, but dividing your army into two halves and attacking just means that the enemy can easily deal with both sides one by one
Technology selection in encryption protocols: It may be meaningful to use technology A, and it may be meaningful to use technology B. However, some mixing between the two may only lead to unnecessary complexity, or even increase the risk of mutual interference.
Examples of concave decisions include:
Judicial decisions: The average value between two independently selected decisions may be more likely to be fair than the random selection of one of the two decisions, but it is unlikely to be completely absurd.
Public product fundsGenerally, it is more effective to provide $X to each of two promising projects than to give $2X to one project without giving the other one. Compared with that from $X to $2X, having any funds can greatly promote the ability of the project to achieve its mission.
tax rate: Due to the mechanism of secondary deadweight loss, the tax rate of X% is usually only a quarter of the tax rate of 2X%, which is harmful. At the same time, it has more than half the effect in increasing income. Therefore, a moderate tax is better than a coin flip between low/no tax and high tax.
When the decision is convex, the decentralized decision-making process can easily lead to confusion and low-quality compromise. On the other hand, when the decision is not clear, relying on the wisdom of the masses can give a better answer. In these cases, a DAO like structure with a large number of different inputs for decision making may make sense. In fact, people who view the world as a more concave place are more likely to see the need for decentralization in a broader environment.
Should VitaDAO and Ukrainian DAO become DAOs?
Many recent DAOs are different from earlier DAOs (such as MakerDAO), because earlier DAOs were organized around providing infrastructure, while newer DAOs were organized around performing various tasks around specific topics. VitaDAO is a DAO that supports early longevity research, and Ukraine DAO is a DAO organization and funding work related to helping Ukrainian war victims and supporting Ukraine's national defense. Does it make sense for these to become DAOs?
This is a delicate question. We can get a possible answer by understanding the internal operation of the Ukrainian DAO itself. A typical DAO tends to "decentralize" by aggregating large amounts of money into a pool and using token holders to vote to fund each distribution. On the other hand, UkraineDAO works by splitting its functions into many pods, each of which works independently as much as possible. Top level governance can create new pods (in principle, governance can also provide funds for pods, although so far, funds only flow to external organizations related to Ukraine), but once a pod is created and resources are given, its functions mainly depend on its own. Internally, each pod does have leaders and operates in a more centralized manner, although they still try to respect the spirit of individual autonomy.
A natural question might be:Isn't this "DAO" a renaming of the traditional concept of multi tier hierarchy?I would say it depends on the implementation: of course, you can adopt this template and turn it into something with authority, just like a typical large company, but you can also use the template in a very different way.
Two things that help ensure that organizations built in this way will actually become meaningful decentralization include:
realHighly autonomous podThe pod receives resources from the core. If they want to continue to obtain these resources, they will occasionally check the alignment and capability, but otherwise they will completely act on their own and will not "accept orders" from the core.
Highly decentralized and diversified core governance。 This does not require a "governance token", but it does require more extensive and diversified core participation. Generally, extensive and diversified participation is a huge burden on efficiency. However, if (1) is met, then the pod is highly autonomous, and the core needs to make fewer decisions, then the impact of lower top governance efficiency will become smaller.
Now, how does this fit into the "convex and concave" frame? Here, the answer is roughly as follows:（The top layer is concave, and the bottom layer (more concentrated in each pod) is convex。 It is usually better to give a pod X than to give it a coin flip between $0 and $2X, and it will not cause great losses because the philosophy of compromise or "inconsistency" guides different decisions. However, in each individual pod, it is more important to have a clear, opinionated view to guide decision-making, and to be able to adhere to many synergistic choices.
Decentralization and review resistance
The reason why the decentralization of cryptocurrency is most often cited publicly is the resistance of review: DAO or protocols need to be able to operate and protect themselves against external attacks (including from large companies or even state actors). This has been discussed publicly and in detail, so there is no need to repeat it, but there are still some important nuances.
The two most successful anti censorship services used by many people today are The Pirate Bay and Sci Hub. Pirate Bay is a hybrid system: it is BitTorrent's search engine, which is a highly decentralized network, but the search engine itself is centralized. It has a small core team, dedicated to keeping it running, and uses the mole's strategy of fighting the mole to protect itself: when the hammer falls, get out of the way and reappear elsewhere. Pirate Bay and Sci Hub often change their domain names, rely on arbitrage between different jurisdictions, and use various other technologies. This strategy is centralized, but it allows them to succeed in defense and product improvement agility.
DAO is not like The Pirate Bay and Sci Hub; DAO behaves like BitTorrent.BitTorrent doesThe need for decentralization isReason: It not only requires resistance to review, but also requires long-term investment and reliability。 If BitTorrent is shut down once a year and all its seeders and users are required to switch to a new provider, the network quality will rapidly decline. DAOs that require resistance to review should also fall into the same category: the services they should provide should not only avoid permanent review, but also avoid simple instability and destruction. MakerDAO (and Reflexer DAO to manage RAI) is a good example. DAOs running decentralized search engines may not: you can build a regular search engine and use Sci Hub style technology to ensure its survival.
Decentralization is credible and fair
Sometimes, the main concern of the DAO is not to resist the needs of the nation-state, but to assume certain functions of the nation-state. This usually involves tasks that can be described as "maintaining basic infrastructure". Due to the weak ability of the government to supervise the DAO, the structure of the DAO needs to have greater self supervision ability. This requires decentralization.
Consider three incentive examples: algorithmic stable currency, Kleros court and Optimism retroactive financing mechanism.
Algorithm stable currency DAOIt is a system that uses financial contracts on the chain to create encrypted assets. Its price tracks some stable indexes, usually but not necessarily dollars.
Kleros is a "go to centerChemical court”: A DAO whose function is to make an award on arbitration issues, such as "Has this Github submitted an acceptable submission for the reward on the chain?"
Optimism's retroactive financing mechanismIs Optimism As a component of DAO, it retroactively rewards projects that provide value to Ethereum and Optimism ecosystems.
In these three cases, subjective judgment is required, which cannot be automatically completed by a piece of on chain code. In the first case, the goal is to measure some price indexes reasonably and accurately. If the stable currency tracks USD, you only need ETH/USD price. In case of hyperinflation or other reasons for giving up the US dollar, the stable currency DAO may need to manage the reliable chain CPI calculation. Kleros makes an inevitable subjective judgment on any arbitrary question submitted to it, including whether the submitted question should be rejected because of "immorality"& nbsp; Optimism's task of tracing funds is one of the most open subjective questions: which projects have completed the most useful work for Ethereum and Optimism's ecosystem?
These three cases inevitably need "governance", and governance is also quite stable. In all cases, governance can be attacked both externally and internally, which can easily lead to very big problems. Finally, governance not only needs to be robust, but also needs to convincingly convince the vast and distrustful public that it is robust.
The Achilles' heel of algorithm to stabilize currency: oracle
The stability of the algorithm depends on the oracle. In order to let the on chain smart contract know whether the DAI value is 0.005 ETH or 0.0005 ETH, it needs some mechanisms to learn the (off chain) information price of ETH/USD. In fact, this "oracle" is the main place where the algorithm stable currency can be attacked.
This leads to a security problem: the algorithmic stable coin cannot safely hold more collateral, so it cannot issue more units than the market value of its speculative tokens (such as MKR, FLX...), because if it does, it will become a half of the speculative tokens purchased, and use these tokens to control the oracle, It is profitable to steal funds from users by providing bad oracle value and clearing them.
This is a possible alternative design for the stable coin oracle: add an indirect layer. Reference ethreasear Ch's post:
We have established a contract with 13 "suppliers"; The answer to the query is the median of the answers returned by these providers. Vote once a week, and the oracle token holder can change one of the providers
The security model is simple: if you trust the voting mechanism, you can trust the output of the oracle unless seven providers are destroyed at the same time. If you trust the current set of oracle providers, you can trust the output for at least the next six weeks, even if you do not trust the voting mechanism at all. Therefore, if the voting mechanism is broken, the participants of any application that relies on the oracle will have time to exit in an orderly manner.
Please note the non corporate nature of the proposal. It involves depriving governance of the ability to act quickly, and intentionally spreading the responsibility of prophecy to a large number of participants. This is valuable for two reasons. First of all, it makes it harder for outsiders to attack the oracle, and it also makes it harder for new coin holders to quickly take over the control of the oracle. Secondly, it makes it more difficult for oracle participants themselves to collude to attack the system. It also alleviates the oracle extractable value, where a single provider may deliberately delay publishing in order to personally benefit from clearing (in a multi provider system, if one provider does not publish immediately, other providers will publish soon).
Fairness in Kleros
The "Decentralized Court" system Kleros is a very valuable and important infrastructure of the Ethereum ecosystem: human beings prove to use it, various "smart contract error insurance" products use it, and many other projects regard it as some kind of "final verdict".
Recently, whether the decision-making of the platform is fair has aroused some public concerns. Some participants put forward cases to try to claim from the decentralized smart contract insurance platform that they think they deserve. Perhaps the most famous of these cases is Mizu's report on Case # 1170. The case evolved from a slight verbal interpretation dispute to a broader scandal, because some people accused Kleros's own insiders of coordinating efforts and investing a lot of tokens to promote the decision in the direction they want. Participants in the debate wrote:
The court's decision making process based on incentives... was, on all appearances, undermined by a developer who owned a very large (25%) stake in the court.
Of course, this is only one aspect of an issue in the wider debate, where the Kleros community decides who is right and who is wrong and how to respond. However, from the point of view of this individual case, what is important here is that the whole value proposition of something like Kleros depends on its ability to convince the public that it is strongly protected from such centralized manipulation. For something like Kleros to be trusted, it seems necessary that no one should own 25% of the shares in the High Court. Whether through more widely distributed token supply or more use of non token driven governance, a more credible form of decentralized governance can help Kleros completely avoid such concerns.
Optimism traceability fundraising
The first round of retrospective fundraising of Optimism was selected by 24 "badge holders" through a second vote. In the second round, more badge holders may be used, and the ultimate goal is to transfer to a system where more citizens control the retroactive allocation of funds, possibly through some multi-layer mechanisms involving lotteries, subcommittees and/or authorizations.
There is some internal debate about whether there are more and fewer citizens: does "citizen" really mean closer to "senator", an expert contributor who has a deep understanding of Optimism ecosystem, and whether it should be a position for almost anyone? Is there a significant involvement in the Optimism ecosystem, or is it somewhere in between?On this issue, my personal position has always been to develop towards more citizens, and solve the problem of low governance efficiency through the second layer of authorization, rather than adding sacred centralization to the governance agreement. A key reason for my position is the possibility of insider trading and self trading。
Optimism retroactive financing mechanism has always been aimed at combining with the expected speculative ecosystem: public welfare projects that need funds now can sell "project tokens", and anyone who buys project tokens is eligible for compensation for huge retroactive funding in the future. However, whether this mechanism can operate normally depends on whether the retroactive fund part works normally and is easily affected by the destruction of the retroactive fund mechanism. Some example attacks:
If some people have decided how they will vote on an item, they can buy (or short if the price is too high) their item tokens before issuing a decision.
If some people know that they will decide on a particular project later, they can buy project tokens in advance and then deliberately vote for it, even if the project is not actually worth funding.
The fund decision-maker can accept bribes from the project.
There are usually three ways to deal with these types of corruption and insider trading:
Retroactively punish malicious decision makers.
Actively filter higher quality decision makers.
Add more decision makers.
The business community usually focuses on the first two, using financial supervision and wise punishment for the first time, and face-to-face interview and background investigation for the second time. The decentralized world has few opportunities to use such tools: project tokens may be traded anonymously, the amount of recourse of the DAO to the external judicial system is limited, and the remote and online nature of the project and the desire for global inclusiveness make it more difficult for it to do background research and informal on-site "olfactory testing" of personality. Therefore, the decentralized world needs to pay more attention to the third technology: allocate decision-making power to more decision-makers, so that each decision-maker will have less power, so collusion is easier to report and expose.
Should DAOs learn more from corporate governance or politics?
The main "big idea" of Curtis Yarvin, an American philosopher, is that companies are more effective and optimized than the government. Therefore, we should improve the government by making the government look more like a company (for example, far from democracy and closer to the monarchy). Recently, he wrote a chapter expressing his ideas on how to design DAO governance. Not surprisingly, his answer involves borrowing ideas from traditional corporate governance. From his introduction:
On the contrary, since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the basic design of British and American limited liability companies has remained basically unchanged - reverse historians may argue that the industrial revolution may actually be an enterprise revolution. If the shareholding system design is not completely optimal, we can expect it to be almost optimal.
Although there are classification differences between these two types of organizations - we can call them first order (sovereign) and second order (contractual) organizations - it seems that there are very effective second order organizations in society this year, but there is no very effective first order organization.
Therefore, we may know more about the secondary organization. Therefore, when designing DAO, we should start from corporate governance, not from politics.
Yarvin's post correctly identified the key difference between "first level" (sovereignty) and "second level" (contract) organizations - in fact, the exact difference is just the theme of my above trusted post about fairness. However, Yarvin's post soon made a big and surprising mistake. He immediately turned to corporate governance as a better starting point for how DAO should operate. This error is surprising, because the logic of this situation seems to almost directly imply the opposite conclusion.Because DAO is not superior to their sovereignty, and usually explicitly engages in the business of providing services normally reserved for sovereignty (such as currency and arbitration), this is the design of sovereignty (political science), not the design of sovereignty. Corporate governance, DAO has more to learn.
It is commendable that the second part of his post does advocate an "hourglass" model, which combines decentralized alignment and accountability layers as well as centralized management and execution layers, but it has been recognized that DAO design needs to be at least from the first level organization to the second level organization.
The reason why sovereigns are inefficient and companies are efficient is the same as the reason why number theory can prove many things but abstract group theory can prove much less:Companies fail less and accomplish more because they can make more assumptions and have more powerful tools to use。 If necessary, the company can count on the local sovereign state to defend them and provide the external legal system they can rely on to stabilize their incentive structure. On the other hand, in sovereign countries, the biggest challenge is usually what to do when the incentive structure is attacked and/or faced with the risk of total collapse. No external giant is ready to support it.
The biggest problem in designing a successful governance system for a sovereign state may be what Samo Burja called "the succession problem": how to ensure the continuity of the system when it is managed by one group of people and retired by another group. Burja wrote that companies usually do not solve problems at all:
Silicon Valley is keen on "subversion", because we are used to the succession problems that remain unsolved in discrete institutions such as companies.
Finally, DAO needs to solve the inheritance problem (in fact, given the high frequency of "get rich and retire" mode among early adopters of encryption, some DAOs have had to deal with the inheritance problem). The form of monarchy and similar companies is often difficult to solve the problem of inheritance, because the institutional structure is closely linked with the habits of specific people, which is either difficult to hand over, or the risk is high, and there are endless debates about whom to hand it over. More decentralized political forms such as democracy have at least one theory on how to make a smooth transition. Therefore, I believe that for this reason, DAO needs to learn more from the more liberal and democratic political school, rather than from corporate governance.
Of course, in some cases, the DAO must complete specific complex tasks, and it may be a good idea to use a form similar to that of a company to complete these tasks. In addition, the DAO needs to deal with unexpected uncertainties. A system designed to operate in a stable and unchanging manner around a set of assumptions, when faced with extreme and unexpected changes in these situations, it really needs some brave leader to coordinate the response. A typical example of the latter is the stable currency dealing with the collapse of the US dollar: when a stable currency DAO evolves around the assumption that it is only trying to track the US dollar, what tracking will happen when suddenly faced with a world where the US dollar is no longer viable, and needs to quickly switch to a certain CPI?
If the dollar is no longer a viable reference asset, the stylized chart of the internal experience of the RAI ecosystem will unexpectedly transition to a CPI based system.
Here, methods inspired by corporate governance may look better, because they provide a ready-made model to deal with the problem that the founders organize a fulcrum. However, it has been proved that the history of the political system also provides a model that is very suitable for this situation, and covers the problem of how to return to the decentralized model after the crisis: the Republic of Rome elects a dictator temporarily appointed to deal with the crisis.
In fact, we may only need a few DAOs that look more like political science than corporate governance. But these are really important.A stable currency does not need to be efficient; It must first and foremost be stable and decentralized. A decentralized court is similar. A system that guides funds for a specific cause - whether it is optimistic retrospective funds, VitaDAO, Ukraine DAO or others - is being optimized for a purpose that is more complex than profit maximization. Therefore, a coordinated solution other than shareholder profits is needed to ensure that it maintains funds for the intended purpose.
So far, even in the cryptocurrency world, the largest number of organizations will become "contract" second tier organizations, and ultimately rely on these first tier giants for support. For these organizations, it is usually intentional to emphasize agility governance in a simpler and leader driven form. But this should not disperse the fact that the ecosystem will not survive without some non corporate decentralized forms to maintain the stability of the whole thing.